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Introduction
The aim of the paper is to examine whether changes in dividends may be treated 
as a signal from the managers about future performance of the company. We want 
to give evidence that in the market with high level of information asymmetry such 
as NewConnect (NC) payout policy may be interpreted as a tool for investors to 
build expectations about future financial results and therefore it could be a way of 
limitation the agency costs.
The NC market is characterised by relatively low entry barriers, although they 
were even lower prior to the radical change of regulation introduced in 2013. The 
companies issue shares usually under private placement with low dispersion of 
ownership on the basis of a modest information document. The market is open to 
relatively small companies with higher investment risks. Main owners usually remain 
on the management boards and institutional investors hardly appear on the market. 
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The market coverage of analysts is small (Top Pick NewConnect stocks are exception 
to the rule). On such a market, companies that pay regular dividends are rare, so we 
suspected that those who opted to pay would have preferred to use dividend policy 
as a communication tool to reduce information asymmetry.
Our sample consists of 42 companies listed on the NC market between 2007 and 
2016. The observation covered companies that had paid dividends for at least three 
consecutive years. A suspension of the payment for a maximum one year was allowed.
This paper makes contribution to the literature based on the unique hand-collected 
data. There is still a research gap in the Polish market dealing with dividend as a tool 
of signalling of future results of companies quoted on alternative investment market 
NewConnect which has not been the object of research before. For practitioners it is 
important that dividends changes do not act as predictors of future earnings.
1. Background literature
According to the agency theory [Jensen, Meckling, 1976; Kowerski, 2011], there 
are conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers of public companies. 
The dividend payout is against the needs of management and generates necessity to 
raise capital. Dividends treated as draining the company’s free cash flow limit the 
investing activities of management board.
According to the signalling theory, dividend payouts diminish information asym-
metry and are perceived as signals sent to the market by managers. They can be 
regarded as a way of delivering information about the current and future situation 
of a company. A change in the dividend may suggest the definite direction in which 
future earnings will head [Allen, Michaely, 2003]. A raise in dividend may be per-
ceived as an announcement of improving future earnings. On the other hand, lowering 
dividend may suggest deterioration of a company’s situation. Managers are reluctant 
to increase payouts, although they currently could manage it if they are not fully 
convinced about the sustainability of the company’s profits in the future. It is due to 
fear of consequences resulting from a potential reduction in dividend in case they 
would not be able to keep payouts on a higher level continuously.
The beginning of deliberations on the signalling effect of dividends can be found 
in the work of Lintner [1956]. He claimed that a dividend increase is most likely 
not a signal of announcement for future earnings growth, but the permanent change 
of actual earnings. According to Lintner, dividend policy decisions are being made 
in such way that managers strive to reach a target payout ratio in the long term by 
gradually adjusting the dividend to this level through subsequent periods. Also, in 
case of only transitory shocks of profits dividends are being relatively smoothed 
instead of being aligned to the change in profits straight away. This stems from the 
conviction that managers want to avoid cutting dividends when a higher dividend 
payout is no longer justified. Miller and Modigliani [1961] emphasised the existence 
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of the so-called information content of dividends. They believe that the change in 
a dividend payout ratio affects the change of the market price of the company. Miller 
and Modigliani argue that dividend payment can provide a signal about the current 
financial situation and development prospects of the entity. Because of this, issuers 
can change investors' expectations about the level of profits in subsequent periods.
Numerous empirical studies about signalling theory of dividends have been con-
ducted (Table 1). The authors concentrated mainly on the accuracy of the assumption 
that a change in dividend payout is accompanied by a change of profits and/or of 
share price, but the hypothesis has not been explicitly confirmed so far.
Table 1. Literature review about signalling theory
Authors (year 
of publication)
Stock exchange,  
sample size
Effects Results
Watts [1973]
310 dividend- changing 
companies from S&P’s 
Compustat Annual 
Investment tapes
Impact on future 
earnings
Positive, but small relationship 
between changes in size of future 
earnings and unexpected changes in 
the actual level of dividends
Laub [1976]
30 dividend-changing 
companies
Impact on future 
earnings
Results consistent with Watts’s, but 
stronger
Aharony, Swary 
[1980]
NYSE, 149  
dividend-changing 
companies
Dividends provide 
additional information 
about future prospects 
than quarterly earnings
Support for the information content 
of dividends
Penman [1983]
246 dividend-changing 
companies from 
Compustat Annual 
Investment tapes
If information con-
tained in earnings, 
forecasts are reflected 
in dividend decisions
Information regarding managers’ 
expectation can be obtained from 
earnings forecasts and dividend 
announcements
Healy, Palepu 
[1988]
NYSE/AMEX, 131  
initiations 172 omissions
Dividend relation with 
earnings growth and 
market reaction
Earnings and abnormal price reaction 
in line with dividend initiation or 
omission
Cowan, Sant 
[1994]
NYSE/AMEX, 381  
companies/dividend 
omissions 
Incfluence on compa-
nie’s’ valuation
Increases in return variance, beta and 
the dispersion of earnings forecasts 
occur after dividend omissions
DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, 
Skinner [1996]
NYSE, 145 dividend-
changing companies
Dividends signal future 
earnings
No support for dividend signalling
Benartzi, 
Michaely, Thal-
er [1997]
NYSE/AMEX, 1,025 
companies/7,186 events 
of dividend changes; 561 
initiations, 887 omissions
Dividends convey 
information about 
subsequent earnings
Dividends adjust to the changes in 
earnings. Strong earnings reaction 
after initiation or omission
grullon, 
Michaely, 
Swaminathan 
[2002]
NYSE/AMEX, 7,642  
dividend yields changes
Relationship between 
dividend changes and 
systematic risk and 
changes of life cycle
Earnings fall (grow) when dividends 
increase (decrease); systematic risk 
declines after dividend increase 
announcement; higher dividend 
indicates company’s maturity
Fuller, Thakor 
[2002]
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ, 
1,942 companies/10,505 
dividend changes
Cash-flow-distribution 
motives of dividend 
payments
No evidence to support a concept that 
dividend decisions help to determine 
issuers with superior future earnings
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Authors (year 
of publication)
Stock exchange,  
sample size
Effects Results
vieira,  
Raposo [2007]
Euronext Lisbon  
(84 dividend-changing 
companies), Euronext  
Paris (93), LSE (524)
Relation of dividend 
announcements with 
share price and future 
profitability
No significant support for dividend 
signalling hypothesis for Portuguese 
and French markets. Partial 
confirmation for the UK market
Liljeblom, 
Mollah,  
Rotter [2015]
Danish, Norwegian and 
Swedish markets
Dividends convey 
information about 
future earnings; 
dividend stickiness
Support both theories for the Swedish 
market only
gou, Maung,  
Wilson [2015]
NYSE/ NASDAQ, 36,742 
dividend changes
Effect on changes in 
forecasted earnings, 
and how earnings 
volatility influences 
such an effect
A positive relation between increases 
of dividends and changes in future 
earnings, but findings strongly 
affected by earnings volatility
Source: own compilation.
Despite many papers contemplating on significance of dividend signalling on 
developed market, there is a research gap on the European alternative markets which 
are exposed to the risk of information asymmetry in particular.
2. NewConnect as a market with strong asymmetry of information
After regulation of multilateral trading facilities by EU law [Directive 2004/39/
EC], the Polish stock exchange has introduced its own alternative stock market 
NewConnect in 2007. NC has been dedicated to small- and medium-sized enter-
prises that are in the early development stage, thus, it follows the trend set by other 
markets in Europe.
The NC market considerably differs from the main stock market especially in re-
gard to regulations imposed on the issuers. NewConnect is a non-regulated market and 
is the subject of direct supervision of the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Issuers should meet 
lower entry criteria and disclosure requirements and most of stocks are sold to investors 
under private placement. Considering ownership structure of issuers, in many cases 
the owners are simultaneously members of management boards of listed companies.
Another characteristic of NewConnect is a dominant role of individual investors. 
Although the involvement of institutional investors increases year by year, it is still 
negligible because of the poor market liquidity, low value of emissions (often do not 
exceed several million PLN) as well as poor information transparency.
Despite strengthening of the regulations, there is still greater information asym-
metry occurring on NewConnect in comparison to the main market. One of the 
methods that helps to reduce agency costs being a result of monitoring companies’ 
activities in order to reduce information asymmetry is dividend payout policy. This 
leads to the following hypothesis H1: dividend changes positively influence the future 
financial performance measured by revenues, operating earnings and net income.
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3. The data and research design
A sample of 42 firms was selected from those listed on the NewConnect market. 
Each firm met the following criteria:
− the company paid dividend for at least three consecutive years or during at 
least four years it did not pay dividend in only one of the years,
− the company did not pay advance dividends,
− the company was present on the market long enough to publish the annual 
reports following the years in which it paid dividends.
The resulting sample contains 98 observations of dividend changes. The financial 
data was hand-collected from annual financial reports and the information about 
dividend proposals were collected based on current reports (disclosures after general 
meetings announcing dividend decisions).
To investigate our hypothesis, multiple regression is used. We choose dividend 
changes (dDIv) and financial ratios describing size (Assets, Equity), financial lev-
erage (Debt) and profitability (ROA, ROE, ROAop) of companies as independent 
variables. The future performance is characterised by changes of revenues (dRev), 
operating earnings (dOpE) and net income (dNI) treated separately as a dependent 
variable in a regression model.
We determine changes in dividends and changes in financial performance as 
following:
1. Dividend changes dDIv is equal (D
n
/D
n-1
) -1, where D
n
 is total dividend as 
a part of paid earnings achieved in year n, but paid in year n+1.
2. As variable (dependent variable) we use total revenues (Rev), operating 
earnings (OpE) and net income (NI):
a) dvariable_n is equal (variable
n
/variable
n-1
) -1, where variable
n
 refers to the 
year n (year for which dividend was paid), i.e. dvariable_n is a measure 
of changes in historical financial results, which were known before the 
dividend was proposed,
b) dvariable_n1 is equal (variable
n+1
/variable
n
) -1, where variable
n+1
 refers 
to year n (year when dividend was paid), i.e. dvariable_n1 is a measure of 
future changes in financial results, which were not known during the time 
when the dividend was proposed and paid.
3. ‘Assets’ are value of assets in year n.
4. ‘Equity’ are value of equity in year n.
5. ‘Debt’ is a debt ratio equal to a percentage of total liabilities in assets in year n.
6. ROA, ROE, ROAop are return on assets (net income to assets), return on 
equity (net income to equity), operating return on assets (operating earnings to assets) 
in year n.
Our model is specified as:
dvariable_n1 = β0 + β1 * dDIv + β2 * NI_n + β3 * Debt_n + β4 * lnRev + β5 * ROAop + ɛ
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4. Empirical results and analysis
In Table 2 we present descriptive statistics of variables. We can see that dividend 
changes are smaller than changes of net income or operating earnings and bigger 
than changes of revenues.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
variables Arithmetic mean Median Minimum Maximum St. dev.
dDIv 54.7% 0.0% -86.4% 1995.2% 220.8%
Rev_n 62 017.1 20 004.0 2 879.0 693 492.0 126 399.0
dRev_n 24.9% 5.9% -75.5% 659.0% 78.5%
dRev_n1 21.7% 7.2% -42.5% 659.0% 75.1%
OpE_n 2 883.4 1 516.0 -3 785.0 20 756.0 4 166.5
dOpE_n 11.2% -3.8% -9900.0% 3503.0% 1119.6%
dOpE_n1 -19.3% -6.7% -9900.0% 3503.0% 1109.8%
NI_n 2 013.9 1 196.0 -4 100.0 15 847.0 3 077.4
dNI_n 80.1% -2.1% -2436.3% 5366.7% 655.6%
dNI_n1 38.8% -11.5% -2436.3% 5366.7% 623.4%
Assets_n 48 680.6 16 841.0 2 140.0 532 299.0 107 166.0
Equity_n 31 365.6 10 057.5 1 376.0 359 885.0 75 756.1
Debt_n 39.1% 36.7% 1.4% 77.8% 19.8%
ROE 18.4% 13.3% -45.7% 93.2% 22.4%
ROAop 13.1% 8.6% -26.0% 80.4% 16.0%
ROA 10.0% 7.3% -35.4% 62.1% 13.9%
Source: own calculations.
This stickiness of dividend is confirmed by the values of correlations between 
dividend changes and historical changes of performance (ending with _n) which is 
low. However, the correlation ratios referring to the future changes of performance 
(ending with _n1) are even lower (Table 3).
Table 3. Correlation of variables
dDIv dRev_n dRev_n1 dOpE_n dOpE_n1 dNI_n dNI_n1
1 0.3787 0.1344 0.2095 0.0115 0.3892 -0.0088 dDIv
1 -0.0150 0.1381 0.0616 0.8178 -0.0623 dRev_n
1 -0.0750 0.1155 -0.0246 0.8400 dRev_n1
1 0.0153 0.1535 0.0169 dOpE_n
1 -0.0115 0.1196 dOpE_n1
1 -0.0244 dNI_n
1 dNI_n1
Source: own calculations.
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Regression analysis shows that only future changes in revenues are significantly 
explained by the changes in dividends. It occurs that only positive dividend changes 
influence revenues significantly (however negative changes do not) what is shown 
in Table 4.
Table 4. Regression of dividend changes
Dependent 
variable (Y)
dNI_n1 dOpE_n1 dRev_n1
dRev_n1
(for positive dDIv)
Parameters p-value Parameters p-value Parameters p-value Parameters p-value
const 4.20230 0.49 -10.9014 0.3150 0.5446 0.4498 2.5206 0.1139
dDIv 0.16250 0.62 0.1043 0.8598 0.0828** 0.0371 0.1018* 0.0859
NI_n 0.00001 0.98 -0.0004 0.4152 -0.00002 0.4520 0.0000 0.8004
Debt_n 5.80820 0.12 6.7876 0.3033 0.5472 0.2126 0.7724 0.3433
lnRev -0.57820 0.39 0.8372 0.4811 -0.0455 0.5649 -0.2521 0.1455
ROAop -2.89570 0.54 2.7786 0.7412 -0.6354 0.2575 -1.0628 0.2435
R2 0.03000 0.0314 0.0642 0.1097
* p-value under 0.1, ** p-value between 0.05 and 0.01
Source: own calculations.
The conclusions are similar to those shown by Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler 
[1997]. Again, it seems that dividends do not act as predictors of future earnings. Only 
with weak significance (p-value below 5%) the changes in revenues are explained 
by the changes in dividends. It does not support our hypothesis. Similar conclusions 
were shown by Brycz and Pauka [2013] that the information power of dividends is 
not so strong to be the base for expectations for investors.
Conclusions
Our hypothesis is not proven based on the sample we collected from New-
Connect. Although the market is not transparent and many characteristics justify 
presence of high level of information asymmetry, dividend may not be treated as 
a signal to raise expectations of investors about future financial results. Only changes 
of revenues with a very weak level of significance seem to be influenced by (only 
positive) changes of dividends. We show that dividend changes are more strongly 
correlated with historical changes in performance than with future ones. It could 
mean that managers decide to change dividends not in reaction to expected but to 
already obtained results.
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Sygnalizacja wyników finansowych w polityce dywidendowej na rynku NewConnect
Celem artykułu jest sprawdzenie, czy zmiany w poziomie wypłacanych dywidend można uznać za 
informacje sygnalizujące zmiany w przyszłych wynikach finansowych (przychodach, zyskach operacyj-
nych, wyniku netto). Próba dotyczy 42 spółek notowanych na rynku NewConnect w latach 2007–2016, 
wypłacających regularnie dywidendę przez co najmniej 3 lata. Wykorzystując modele regresji liniowej, 
pokazano, że zmiany w poziomie wypłacanych dywidend pozytywnie wpływają na zmiany w przychodach, 
jednak w sposób nieistotny wyjaśniają zmiany wyników operacyjnych i wyników netto. Praca wypełnia 
lukę w badaniach empirycznych nad polskim rynkiem akcji – w szczególności po raz pierwszy zbadano 
funkcję sygnalizacyjną dywidend na rynku NewConnect, który charakteryzuje się wysokim poziomem 
asymetrii informacji.
Performance Signalling of Dividend Policy on the NewConnect Market
The aim of the paper was to give evidence whether changes of dividends could be considered as 
signals forecasting changes in future financial results. The sample consists of 42 companies listed on the 
NewConnect market in the years 2007–2016, paying regular dividends for at least 3 years. Using linear 
regression models, we show that dividend changes have a weak but positive effect on revenues changes, 
but they are insignificant when explaining changes in operating performance and net income. The paper fills 
a gap in empirical research on the Polish stock market, and especially the signalling function of dividends 
on NewConnect, which is characterised by a high degree of information asymmetry, has been examined 
for the first time.
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